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● The viability of a sharing economy platform is determined by the central actor’s 
ability to actively manage and, in the long term, maintain synergies between the 
value it creates and the value it appropriates. 
 
●  Development of a multi-stakeholder network in the sharing economy is not self-
governed, but rather a well-designed process that is developed and managed by the 
central actor. 
 
● We posit eight value-driving mechanisms through which the central actor can 
simultaneously increase platform stickiness (ability to draw in and keep 
stakeholders) and stakeholder profitability (ability to capture value from multiple 
stakeholders). 
 
● We integrate value-driving mechanisms in the Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder 
Profitability Framework that not only offers novel theoretical insights, but can also 
be used by practitioners to improve their stakeholder management strategies. 
 
● Our study extends the sharing economy literature into the B2B context by 
providing empirical insights into the UK’s first-of-a-kind B2B platform that is 














To survive and prosper, firms need to be able to capture the value they create. The role of 
the central actor in developing a viable multi-stakeholder platform resides in its ability to 
continuously manage synergies between the value it enables and creates, and the value it 
appropriates. However, capturing value is more difficult than its creation, which often 
results in a rather short lifespan of many platform-based businesses. Existing literature, 
however, neglects the role of the central actor in orchestrating value in these platforms, and 
mostly focuses on mechanisms through which diverse stakeholders gain financial benefits 
and appropriate value for themselves. With an aim to contribute to this research field, we 
draw upon stakeholder theory and a longitudinal case study of HeadBox, the first online 
B2B sharing economy-based platform that enables businesses to offer and hire inspiring 
off-site spaces and associated services in the United Kingdom. We put forward a Platform 
Stickiness – Stakeholder Profitability Framework that establishes the missing connection 
between value creation and value appropriation by the central actor in multi-stakeholder 
platforms. The framework integrates eight ‘value-driving’ mechanisms that impact the 






 1. Introduction  
  
While the number of companies whose offering is embedded in core tenets of the sharing 
economy is growing, a large number of them do not enjoy a long lifespan (Plenter, Fielt, 
Hoffen, Chasin, & Rosemann, 2017; Täuscher & Kietzmann, 2017). To survive and 
prosper they need to be able to capture the value they create. However, “capturing value is 
often much more difficult than creating it” (Bock & George, 2018, p. 80). When compared 
with ‘traditional’ economies (Cusumano, 2015), in the sharing economy “organizations do 
not produce resources; they provide the infrastructure for individuals [and companies] to 
access or share existing resources that they already possess” (Mair & Reischauer, 2017, p. 
4). This infrastructure is provided and continuously developed by the central actor, and it 
usually takes the form of a digital platform (Kenney & Zysman, 2016)  that not only 
facilitates transactions but, also enables value co-creation among all stakeholders within 
the network (Lindgreen & Wynstra, 2005; Vargo & Lusch, 2004). As postulated by Alves, 
Fernandes and Raposo (2016, p.1627) “co-creation occurs whenever the resources of one 
system integrate with those available in other service systems.” Therefore, the value is “co-
created in interaction between customers, sellers and other actors in complex B2B 
systems” (Marcos-Cuevas, Nätti, Palo, & Baumann, 2016, p.97).  However, the processes 
and structures of value co-creation are yet not well documented within the literature 
(Corsaro, Ramos, Henneberg, & Naudé, 2012) and, several authors call for more research 
into value co-creation among multiple stakeholders at the network level (Reypens, 
Lievens, & Blazevic, 2016). As postulated by Reypens et al. (2016, p.41), co-creation 
requires “coordination of stakeholders and their activities” which, within sharing economy 
platforms is undertaken by the central actor. In our context, the central actor is defined as a 
facilitator of the platform that is responsible for orchestrating a sharing economy platform 
that consists of multiple diverse stakeholders at both supply and demand sides 
(Constantiou, Marton, & Tuunainen, 2017). These stakeholders play different roles within 
the platform, and usually their power, behavior, level of influence and/or interaction with 
the central actor and with other stakeholders changes over time (Harrison, Bosse, & 
Phillips, 2007; Lappi, Haapasalo, & Aaltonen, 2015; Santos Leitão & Russi De Domenico, 
2015). The importance and influence of different stakeholders often depend on lifecycle 
phase at which the platform is at the given time (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), which, 
leads to continually changing stakeholder dimensions (Reypens et al., 2016; Täuscher & 




orchestration challenges for the central actor (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011), because it not 
only needs to respond to the changing roles of multiple stakeholders but, also to anticipate 
them (Powell & Swart, 2010). In line with arguments put forward by Moore (1996), we 
consider platforms to be both, deliberate and co-evolutionary. It is the central actor that 
deliberately develops the platform (platform owner) however, this platform then 
continuously co-evolves as a result of actions, relationships, and interaction between 
central actor and its stakeholders, and among stakeholders themselves. Arguably, it is 
somewhat rare that stakeholders’ roles remain static during the platform’s lifecycle and 
therefore, in this paper we also aim to establish a dynamic stakeholder dimension that 
helps us to understand their changing roles and influence over the platform. In doing so, 
we build on the abovementioned works of Reypens et al. (2016) and Täuscher and 
Kietzmann (2017).  
 
The existing definitions of platforms are often limited to product and technology aspects 
but, neglect the interconnected actions of different stakeholders within the network. For the 
purpose of this study we adopt the recent definition by Perks, Kowalkowski, Witell, and 
Gustafsson (2017, p. 107), who established the term ‘value platforms’ to describe the 
“dynamic configurations of (tangible and intangible) resources that act as a foundation 
upon which network members co-create value through a set of specific practices.”  Over 
the years, stakeholder theory started to divert from its basic philosophical underpinnings, 
which are grounded in the ‘interconnectedness’ of stakeholders (Freeman, Harrison, & 
Wicks, 2007). In essence, extant literature marginalises the relationships and interactions 
between the central actor and its stakeholders, and examines the role and impact of 
stakeholders rather from the ‘entitlement’ perspective: what duties a central actor has 
towards different stakeholders (i.e., to whom it is accountable) (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000). The contemporary contributions to this theory mostly 
ignore the role of stakeholders in creating value for the central actor and each other 
(Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; 
Lankoski, Smith, & Van Wassenhove, 2016). It is precisely the role of the central actor to 
ensure the sustainability of the sharing economy platform by continuously co-developing 
value-adding offerings with and for its diverse stakeholders while increasing value capture 
opportunities for itself (Dass & Kumar, 2014; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Gobble, 2014; 




symbiotic stakeholder network that “facilitate[s] exchange and value creation” (Aarikka-
Stenroos & Ritala, 2017, p. 25) for all of its stakeholders. However, there is a lack of 
research that explores how the central actor can successfully manage these diverse 
stakeholders to jointly create and capture value in multi-sided platforms (Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011; Reypens et al., 2016). 
 
This study therefore, contributes to stakeholder theory as well as the emerging debate on 
the conceptualisation of the sharing economy by responding to several future research calls 
by Reypens et al. (2016, p. 47), Gawer and Cusumano (2014, p. 422), Harrison and Wicks 
(2013, p. 98), and Aarikka-Stenroos, Jaakkola, Harrison, and Mäkitalo-Keinonen (2017, p. 
88) to: a) focus on investigating practices that facilitate value creation used by a central 
actor that is in charge of managing a multi-stakeholder innovation network; and b) improve 
our ‘understanding [of] why central actors succeed over time [and] why stakeholders are 
drawn to (and remain with) some central actors.’ This leads us to the following research 
question: 
 
How does the central actor increase the viability of a multi-stakeholder platform in the 
sharing economy? 
 
More specifically, we are interested in identifying the value-driving mechanisms that allow 
the central actor to create joint value, while at the same time increasing its own value 
capture opportunities within the platform. Drawing on a longitudinal case study of 
HeadBox, the first B2B online sharing platform that enables business customers to offer 
and hire inspiring off-site spaces (i.e., venues, conference rooms, meeting spaces) and 
associated services in the United Kingdom (UK), we propose a Platform Stickiness – 
Stakeholder Profitability Framework. As Bock and George (2018, p. 80) postulate, “just 
creating something with value does not mean that the [central actor] will actually capture 
it.” Therefore, our framework identifies eight value-driving mechanisms through which the 
central actor can not only create but, also capture value across the platform. In doing so, 
this study establishes the missing connection between value creation and value 
appropriation by a central actor in multi-stakeholder platforms (Reypens et al., 2016; 





We structure the rest of the article as follows. First, the theoretical background section 
introduces the concept of the sharing economy in the B2B context, provides reasoning for 
the choice of our theoretical lens, and offers an overview of our existing knowledge of the 
central actor’s role in multi-stakeholder platforms. Second, we describe the case study and, 
by using the principles of systematic combining, we propose the Platform Stickiness – 
Stakeholder Profitability Framework. Next, we provide a discussion of value-driving 
mechanisms that lead to better stakeholder profitability and increased platform stickiness. 
In the remaining sections, we discuss our contributions to the theory and identify 
managerial implications and future research avenues. 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1 Sharing economy 
 
Almost 15 years ago, Iansiti and Levien (2004, p. 1) suggested that “the strategy 
increasingly becomes the art of managing assets that one does not possess.” Essentially, 
this is the basic premise of the sharing economy in which the central actor enables its 
stakeholders to gain access to assets and complementary services provided by other 
stakeholders, who in exchange benefit in monetary but, also non-monetary ways, from 
providing such access (Mair & Reischauer, 2017). Therefore, the sharing economy is often 
seen as a response to industry inefficiencies derived from underutilized assets and 
resources. As we have already witnessed in hospitality, transportation or pharmaceutical 
industry, sharing economy certainly has the potential to shake up established ‘asset-
dominant’ industries (Belk, 2014). However, despite its potential and growing popularity, 
the concept of the sharing economy has mainly been discussed in practitioner-focused 
journals (Cannon & Summers, 2014; Sundararajan, 2016) and popular business press 
(Howard, 2016; Yu, 2017). The academic research on the sharing economy is still in its 
infancy (Richter, Kraus, Brem, Durst, & Giselbrecht, 2017). To date, research on the 
sharing economy is limited to motivations to share (Bucher, Fieseler, & Lutz, 2016; 
Habibi, Kim, & Laroche, 2016; Hellwig, Morhart, Girardin, & Hauser, 2015; Lamberton & 
Rose, 2012; Möhlmann, 2015; Piscicelli, Cooper, & Fisher, 2015), trust (Ert, Fleischer, & 
Magen, 2016), competition (Cusumano, 2015) and legislation (Guttentag, 2015 Kassan & 




academic journals, the Airbnb and Uber constitute some of the best‐known and widely 
discussed examples of this phenomenon (Gerom, 2013) however, many lesser talked-about 
examples of successful sharing economy platforms exists within the B2B markets. An 
interesting example of such a platform is one developed by MedImmune, a global 
biologics R&D subsidiary owned by AstraZeneca, and  Merck & Co, an American 
pharmaceutical company. The companies formed a 15-year manufacturing capacity-
sharing agreement in 2011 to utilize MedImmune’s Frederick, Maryland, facility for 
Merck’s bulk product manufacturing. The driver behind the partnership was MedImmune’s 
inability to fully utilize its plant, due to delays in product commercialization. The cost of 
operational expenses of staff and depreciation of the manufacturing assets was expected to 
reach $100 million per year, and MedImmune did not want their staff to remain in ‘standby 
status.’ Apart from providing Merck & Co. with access to capacity for the company’s 
maturing biologics pipeline, both parties agreed to share microbial bulk capacity, high-
capacity mAb filling, and live-virus filling (Van Arnum, 2012). Another example of a B2B 
sharing platform that contributes to a good cause is Fareshare, a charity that aims to relieve 
food poverty and reduce food waste in the UK. To achieve this, it partners with 
supermarkets, (i.e., Tesco, Sainsbury’s) and distributes surplus food to local charities, 
cooks meals for underprivileged people, while at the same time helps to reduce food waste. 
For instance, in 2017 Foodshare managed 16,992 tonnes of food, reached 1,500 towns, 
saving the charity sector £28.7 million in a single year (Fareshare, 2018).  
 
Participation of businesses in the sharing economy is proliferating (Botsman & Rogers, 
2011; Täuscher & Kietzmann, 2017). To a large extent, this growth is fuelled by changing 
consumption patterns and advancement of technology-enabled platforms (Constantiou et 
al., 2017; Schwab, 2016). Businesses in the sharing economy often rely on platforms 
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) to enable value creation and 
appropriation for its multi-stakeholder network (Reypens et al., 2016). These platforms not 
only mediate transaction between diverse stakeholders (Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 
2006) but, also enable the creation of long-term relationships between the central actor and 
stakeholders, and among stakeholders themselves. Essentially, in multi-sided sharing 
economy platforms (Hagiu, 2013; Kumar, Lahiri, & Dogan, 2018; Muzellec, Ronteau, & 
Lambkin, 2015) diverse groups of stakeholders simultaneously create and capture value; 




This is in line with arguments put forward by Evans and Schmalensee (2010, p. 22) who 
postulate that stakeholders’ “participation on the platform affects the quality of the product 
it offers” to other stakeholders (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Therefore, it is these “joint 
actions of [stakeholders] rather than the features and attributes of products” (Perks et al., 
2017, p. 106) that shape the sharing economy platform. This active role that stakeholders 
play in creating and shaping the sharing economy platform offering creates significant 
growth opportunities when compared with the ownership-based economy (Grassmuck, 
2012).  Constantiou et al. (2017, pp. 231-232) postulate that “what distinguishes sharing 
economy platforms from traditional marketplaces, supplier networks, third-party 
intermediaries, service integrators and such, is the way they combine organizational and 
market mechanisms to coordinate platform participation and, ultimately, to create value.” 
There are many differences between sharing economy platforms and traditional e-
commerce platforms and other digital marketplaces such as Google Adwords, Amazon or 
eBay (see Kumar, Lahiri, & Dogan, 2018 for the detailed comparison). However, the most 
fundamental difference when compared to traditional platforms is that “sharing economy 
platforms do not enable the selling and buying of goods but rather facilitate peer-to-peer 
rental and sharing, or, more broadly speaking, temporary access to goods and resources” 
(Constantiou et al., 2017, pp. 233-234).  
 
Attractiveness and the value of the sharing economy platform “increases with the number 
of its users—the more people who use a service the more, new, people will join in” 
(Constantiou et al., 2017, p.234).  As a result, this leads to increased platform stickiness. 
We established this term to refer to central actor’s ability to continuously attract new and 
maintain existing stakeholders within a platform through the effective orchestration of 
value co-creation. Continuously increasing the stickiness of the platform is essential for 
achieving better stakeholder lock-in and reducing the likelihood of switching (Smedlund & 
Faghankhani, 2015). As argued by Smedlund and Faghankhani (2015, p. 1385), “it is 
difficult to lock-in participants if the platform does not continuously offer something new 
and of value. As soon as the platform offering becomes static, it can be copied by a 
competing platform.” Kohler (2015, p.71) postulates that once the central actor can 
continually attract diverse stakeholders to invest their “efforts and resources, the platform’s 
value is extended,” which makes the platform even more attractive. According to Parker, 




more value for their stakeholders than these platforms can capture. As argued by Bock and 
George (2018, p. 80), “capturing value is often much more difficult than creating it.” In 
fact, monetization “is one of the most difficult -and fascinating - issues that any platform 
company must address” (Parker et al., 2016, p.108). Therefore, to increase platform 
profitability,  the central actor needs to be able to capture enough value from its 
stakeholder. We use this term platform profitability to refer to central actors ability to 
continuously develop new processes through which it increases its own value capture 
opportunities.   
 
Our rationale for examining sharing economy platforms from dynamic perspective is in 
line with work of Vargo and Lusch (2011) who postulate that networks need to be viewed 
as dynamic systems where processes for value creation and capture continuously evolve 
(Kohler, 2015; Moser & Gassmann, 2016). However, the relationship between the value 
capture and value creation within networks is yet not well understood and therefore, more 
work is needed in this area (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; 
Reypens et al., 2016). 
2.2 Stakeholder theory  
 
Stakeholders directly influence the central actor’s ability to create, and appropriate value 
for itself and all stakeholders within the platform. In the sharing economy, the central actor 
does not own any assets and depends solely on its stakeholder network to provide access to 
these assets along with other relevant resources and services (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Harrison et al. (2007) argue that “specific types of stakeholder-based resources (e.g., 
knowledge of stakeholders’ utility functions, a reputation for respecting shareholders) and 
capabilities (e.g., continuously forming updated value propositions for stakeholders) enable 
the firm [central actor] to create and appropriate value” (p. 2). Arguably, the success of a 
sharing economy platform depends on the attention that the central actor pays to its 
stakeholders’ needs and interests (Freeman, 1984). However, in the multi-stakeholder 
platforms that are common in the sharing economy (Hagiu, 2013), the central actor is 
confronted with myriad, often diametrically different, needs and goals that are pursued by 
its diverse stakeholders. The extent to which the central actor can balance these goals over 




of stakeholder theory, we argue that the stakeholder network is dynamic (Fassin, 2008, 
2010; Lamberg, Savage, & Pajunen, 2003; Lamberg, Pajunen, Parvinen, & Savage, 2008) 
and therefore characterised by continuous changes in power, influence, interests or 
behavior of stakeholders (Harrison et al., 2007). It is one of the principal roles of the 
central actor to keep abreast of these changes by actively managing the stakeholder 
network. Despite this, the vast majority of the contributions that aimed to advance 
stakeholder theory by establishing different stakeholder dimensions relied heavily on 
adopting a dichotomous view (Miles, 2017). For example, Savage et al. (1991) 
distinguished between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ stakeholders while Mahoney (1994) 
classified stakeholders based on their involvement on active and passive. However, as 
argued by Miles (2017, p. 441) a “major drawback of simple typologies is their inability to 
assess relational attributes such as proximity, connection, co-dependence, or mutual 
exclusivity.”  We argue that the role of different stakeholders in creating, delivering and 
capturing value changes over time as issues faced by company and a context in which it 
operates are changing (Friedman & Miles 2006; Santos Leitão & Russi De Domenico, 
2015; Winn 2001), which leads to constantly changing stakeholder dimensions (Reypens et 
al, 2016; Täuscher & Kietzmann, 2017).  
 
Stakeholder theory revolves around the concept of value and how this value is ‘jointly’ 
created by all stakeholders within a network (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010). For 
instance, in sharing economy it is not only the value of a particular offering that is affected 
by stakeholders’ interaction (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010) but, they have a direct impact 
on the value of the entire platform (Muzellec, Ronteau, & Lambkin, 2015). Paradoxically, 
as Harrison and Wicks (2013) argue, the recent advancements in stakeholder theory take 
‘value’ and what it constitutes for granted. The authors further criticise that the “narrowing 
in conceptions of value tends to obscure other critical aspects of utility relevant to a 
discussion of value – particularly dimensions that extend beyond profitability and 
economic returns” (p. 100). The majority of contributions to stakeholder theory are 
organization-centric and look predominantly at the mechanisms through which individual 
companies create value for themselves by collaborating with external parties (Friedman & 
Miles, 2006). However, as postulated by Agle et al. (2008, p. 166), stakeholder theory is 
“not a theory of the firm [but] rather it is a very simple idea about how people create value 
for each other.” Over the years, research on stakeholder theory started to almost neglect its 




(Freeman et al., 2007). Instead, research has focused on the distribution of economic value 
and the right to these economic outcomes by different stakeholders. In other words, extant 
literature mostly neglects the interaction between stakeholders. Instead, it examines the 
role and impact of stakeholders from an ‘entitlement’ perspective, i.e., what duties the 
central actor has towards different stakeholders and to whom it is accountable (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000). Ignoring the direct or indirect role that 
stakeholders play in creating value for the central actor and one another significantly 
impairs the further development of stakeholder theory (Fassin, 2012; Freeman et al., 2010; 
Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Lankoski et al., 2016). Hence, it is important to conceptualize the 
underlying processes of value creation and its distribution (Harrison et al., 2007). 
However, to do so, we need to uncover the mechanisms through which stakeholders and 
the central actor can influence value creation and appropriation. Harrison and Wicks (2013, 
p. 98) suggest evaluating the definition of value in stakeholder theory and advocate to 
extend this construct beyond economic gains to improve our “understanding [of] why firms 
succeed over time [and] why stakeholders are drawn to (and remain with) some firms.” 
Our paper is taking this direction, and we explore the role the central actor plays in 
drawing in and keeping stakeholders. 
2.3 The role of the central actor in managing stakeholders 
 
The role of the central actor in platform development is becoming increasingly important 
(Thomas, Autio, & Gann, 2014). Growing attention that is paid to the central actor is due 
to the shifting focus from firm-centric innovation to network-centric innovation (Nambisan 
& Sawhney, 2011), where the central actor plays a critical role in orchestrating interactions 
among diverse stakeholders. Despite its growing importance, the existing studies neglect or 
marginalize central actor’s role in orchestrating these networks and instead, focus on 
mechanisms through which diverse stakeholders gain financial benefits and appropriate 
value within these networks (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). The existing literature has 
been significantly influenced by industrial network theory (Ford, 2011; Möller & Halinen, 
2017), which argues that the central actor has limited influence over the network members 
and, the networks are emergent without any guidance. Contradictory to this assumption, 
the research on network orchestration assumes that the central actor can purposefully 
influence and manage the development of a value network (Müller‐Seitz, 2012). To a 




both, deliberate and co-evolutionary (Moore, 1996). It is the central actor that deliberately 
develops the platform (i.e., processes and activities) however, this platform then 
continuously co-evolves as a result of actions, relationships, and interactions between the 
central actor and its stakeholders, and among stakeholders themselves. While the ‘co-
evolution’ requires the central actor to grant some control over the platform to stakeholders 
(Wind, Fung, & Fung, 2009), the central actor still remains responsible for developing and 
orchestrating all core processes and interactions that contribute to value creation and value 
capture within this platform.  Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006, p. 659) define network 
orchestration as “the set of deliberate, purposeful actions undertaken by the hub firm 
[central actor] as it seeks to create value (expand the pie) and extract value (gain a larger 
slice of the pie) from the network.” In their theoretical article, the authors propose that to 
create, and appropriate value from the stakeholder network, the central actor needs to 
ensure knowledge mobility. The knowledge mobility will function effectively in instances 
when the central actor is willing to provide and can access, the knowledge residing at other 
members of the network, learn from them, and share those learnings (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 
2006). Another important orchestration task is to facilitate network stability by trying to 
avoid the rise of competitive pressures among members by, for example, creating more 
value for a certain group of stakeholders. To achieve this, the central actor can focus on 
building much stronger ties with stakeholders through multiplexity – increasing the 
number of joint projects (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Kenis & Knoke, 2002).  
 
In sharing economy, for multi-stakeholder platforms to be viable, not only for the central 
actor but, for all stakeholders, the central actor needs to attain the critical mass (Cusumano 
& Gawer, 2002; Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Given the multifaceted nature of the 
platform, the right timing of stakeholder onboarding and integration is essential to avoid an 
imbalance between supply and demand. Kumar et al. (2017) argue that the central actor’s 
long-term success depends on its ability to acquire, retain and win back profitable 
stakeholders. Each stakeholder has a ‘customer-like power’ to join or not to join the 
platform (Harrison & Wicks, 2013, p. 103). Therefore, the central actor needs to draw in 
these stakeholders by focusing on establishing business relationships that are mutually 
beneficial for all network actors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Visnjic, Neely, Cennamo, 
and Visnjic (2016) argue that for the central actor it is imperative to establish a network 




the central actor faces an increasing number of orchestration challenges related to value 
creation and capture for its stakeholders (Perks et al., 2017). Growing multitude and 
diversity of stakeholders make this process somewhat challenging because, the central 
actor will need to be able to demonstrate value for all stakeholders (Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013). According to Freeman et al. (2010, p. 41), “many stakeholder theorists 
have focused on the inherent conflict between stakeholder interests and, in doing so, they 
have forgotten that stakeholder interests are also joint.” Therefore, instead of being fixated 
on differences among the stakeholders, Harrison, Freeman and Abreu (2015, p. 865) call 
for more research into examining and establishing ‘overlapping interests of various 
stakeholders’ that could lead to more effective stakeholder management strategies. We 
argue that it is precisely the role of the central actor to establish these joint interests, 
reinforce, and leverage them over time to continuously demonstrate value to all 
stakeholders within the platform.  
3. Research methods 
  
To uncover and gain a deeper understanding of the value-driving mechanisms through 
which the central actor increases stakeholder value while at the same time leveraging its 
own value capture opportunities, we adopted an abductive exploratory case study design 
(Blaikie, 2007, 2010).  In essence, we explore how does the central actor increase the 
viability of a multi-stakeholder platform in the sharing economy. Our case study focuses 
on tracking the two-year development of HeadBox, the first B2B online sharing platform 
that enables business customers to offer and hire creative and inspiring off-site spaces 
(including associated services) in the UK. A longitudinal qualitative case study approach 
allowed us to appreciate the evolution and complexities of the iterative processes and 
interlinked value-driving mechanisms during different phases of the platform’s 
development (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Easton, 2010; Aarikka-Stenroos & 
Lehtimäki, 2014). This is fundamental to our understanding of what drives stakeholders in, 
why they remain with the central actor (platform stickiness) and how the central actor can 
capture value from multiple diverse stakeholders (stakeholder profitability). Our approach 
thus responds to Möller and Halinen’s (2017) call for more longitudinal studies that 
investigate the dynamic development of a platform rather than conducting studies that 
capture events at one point in time. Furthermore, there is a  limited number of studies that 




capture in multi-stakeholder networks (Ritala, Agouridas, & Assimakopoulos, 2013). 
Although, the existing literature continues to discuss the importance of establishing such a 
link, the contributions are predominantly theoretically derived (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 
2007). Makadok and Coff (2002) argue that this gap is a result of the dominance of 
resource-based view (RBV), whose primary objective is to explain firm profitability that is 
determined by value captured by the firm. Some of the well-known articles by Barney 
(1986) and Peteraf (1993) refer to RBV as a theory of value capture rather than of value 
creation. Ritala et al. (2013) is one of the few studies that identified tangible and intangible 
mechanisms a central actor can use in the innovation ecosystem to facilitate and ensure 
value creation (i.e., joint forums, meetings to communicate common vision), and value 
capture (i.e., contracts, agreements, plans of each actor’s potential share of outcomes), not 
only for the central actor, but also for the entire ecosystem. In particular, the authors 
uncover benefits of a keystone strategy, when the central actor “ is a more flexible part of a 
diverse ecosystem, proactively and collaboratively developing, leveraging and sharing 
knowledge, capabilities, and value” (Ritala et al., p. 249). However, at the same time, the 
authors criticize the lack of systematic evidence on how central actors can facilitate both 
value creation and value capture in their ecosystems (Ritala et al., 2013). Our study takes 
on this perspective and investigates central actors’ ability to orchestrate joint value creation 
while simultaneously increasing its value capture opportunities in the platform. 
 
The case of HeadBox provides insights into the development and management of a sharing 
economy platform that disrupted the traditional venue-hiring industry in the highly 
neglected B2B context. This case is a unique example of a central actor that managed to 
develop and grow its platform by establishing and maintaining the balance between the 
value it enables and creates for stakeholders, and the value it appropriates. Previous studies 
on the sharing economy are rather descriptive and offer limited variety as they are often 
based on the same well-known cases in the B2C or C2C sector (Mair & Reischauer, 2017), 
such as AirBnB (Guttentag, 2015; Zervas, Proserpio, & Byers, 2017; Belk, 2014), Lyft 
(Sundararajan, 2016), Uber (Cannon & Summers, 2014) or Zipcar (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 
2012). However, ‘the sharing economy also offers opportunities for businesses to share 
with each other’ (Wosskow, 2014, p. 38), but these are not yet well documented. To the 





3.2 Data collection 
  
Data collection spanned a two-year period, from February 2016 to March 2018. We used 
several sources to map out the development of HeadBox’s sharing economy platform. 
Primary data was collected through face-to-face interviews, workshops and company 
visits. In total, our analysis is based on 21 semi-structured interviews and four workshops 
with representatives from all key business functions. We conducted repeated interviews 
with the founder and chief executive officer (CEO), head of marketing, head of product, 
head of sales, and some of HeadBox’s largest corporate stakeholders. Given the diversity 
of respondents, the interview questions were slightly changed for different informants to 
gain insights specific to their field of expertise. We kept interview questions rather open 
and flexible to encourage informants to fully reflect on their experience without any 
restraints. During each interview, departures from the specific questions were allowed to 
pursue interesting new insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In addition, we enriched our primary data by including internal documents, recent press 
releases and by conducting regular short follow-up phone and email interviews with a 
majority of the informants over the course of the study. The use of triangulation (Hinings, 
1997; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016) enabled us to not only enrich our data and provide context 
for the study but, also to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the sharing economy 
platform development and its management. In addition, a draft version of the framework 
was presented at a company meeting. The feedback received was used to help us improve 
and refine our Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder Profitability Framework. 
3.3 Data analysis 
  
Consistent with the principles of systematic combining, our data analysis involved 
matching the theory with empirical observations (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, 2014) by 
continuously moving ‘back and forth’ between empirical data, existing literature and 
theory. The present study followed a non-linear data analysis process in which ‘theoretical 
framework, empirical fieldwork and case analysis evolved simultaneously’ (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002, p. 554). 
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and complemented with email communications, 
documents (i.e., press releases and internal documents), researchers’ observations and 




The data collection and analysis took place simultaneously. The first stage in our data 
analysis focused on re-reading the interview transcripts several times, marking phrases, 
terms, and sections that expressed the informants’ views in their own words, helping us to 
identify initial codes. The codes mainly referred to different ways through which the 
central actor creates value for stakeholders, and mechanisms through which the central 
actor manages the value appropriation across the stakeholder network. The second stage 
consisted of comparisons, grouping and in-depth examination of the relationships among 
the codes to form the first-order categories. Four stakeholder value-driving mechanisms 
and four corresponding mechanisms enabling the central actor to appropriate value 
emerged as first-order categories. During the first two stages of data analysis, the authors 
worked independently. The transcripts were coded independently by two coders. The inter-
coder reliability was manually assessed and calculated by dividing the number of units 
placed in the same category by the number of units coded (Prasad, 2008). It was tested in 
two phases, a pilot test of reliability when coders compared around 30 codes (inter-coder 
reliability coefficient 0.90- satisfactory) that was later followed by assessment of the full 
sample.The extent to which the coders evaluated characteristics of a message and reached 
the same conclusion was around 0.85, which was regarded as satisfactory (Campbell, 
Quincy, Osserman, & Pedersen, 2013). The areas of low agreement in the coding scheme 
enabled the researchers to identify problems (i.e. using generic terms to describe codes, 
using inappropriate words or their synonyms) that were after further discussions clarified 
and led to higher quality results. In such instances was involved also a third researcher and 
majority decision rule was applied. The last step involved generating second-order themes 
that represent a higher level of abstraction in the coding, and at the same time, form the 
two main building blocks of the framework: platform stickiness and stakeholder 
profitability. In summary, the above steps enabled us to develop an empirically derived 
framework that integrates codes, first-order categories, and second-order themes. Our 
coding scheme is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
To help us provide a context as well as direction for our study, we used the stakeholder 
theory as a sensitizing concept  (Bowen 2006; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Harrison & 
Wicks, 2013). The theory served as a general sense of reference and guidance (Blumer 
1954; Bowen 2006), rather than a ‘fixed presentation of pregiven world’ (Sandberg & 




ability to orchestrate joint value creation and simultaneously increase its value capture 
opportunities in the platform. Following principles of abductive research, we used the 
sensitizing concept to build interview protocol, lay the foundation for the data analysis, 
establish the first order categories, and to develop the second order themes (Bowen, 2006). 
For instance, during the process of conducting initial interviews at HeadBox, we observed 
that the concept of organizational affiliation proposed by Harrison and Wicks (2013) 
played a critical role in HeadBox’s success. Stakeholders were willing to actively 
participate in value creation activities mainly because the central actor motivated them to 
do so by building a fully transparent merit-based competition between different 
stakeholder groups. Such dynamics incentivized stakeholders to stay and transact within 
the platform. 
 













The case study takes its starting point in the description of the central actor – HeadBox – 
before identifying the mechanisms used to increase the viability of its multi-stakeholder 
platform in the B2B event industry. We put forward eight value-driving mechanisms 
through which HeadBox was able to: 1) draw in diverse stakeholders, 2) keep and engage 
these stakeholders, and 3) establish multiple monetary and non-monetary value capture 
strategies throughout different phases of its platform development. Building on these 
descriptive accounts, in the second part we present the analysis of the case and introduce 
our Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder Profitability Framework. 
4.1 Case study background - Introduction to HeadBox 
  
HeadBox is the UK’s first online B2B marketplace for venues and associated services. The 
company launched its online platform in May 2015 with a vision to disrupt the event 
industry. The launch of HeadBox was in response to existing rigidities within this industry 
where the ‘whole process of searching and paying for spaces was really painful – manual, 
very inefficient and time-consuming’ (founder and CEO). Using novel technology, 
HeadBox was quick to tackle the key industry challenges, such as lack of transparency, 
inflexible pricing or the limited variety of spaces offered. By continuously addressing these 
major inefficiencies, HeadBox was able to create value for a wide range of diverse 
stakeholders, who as a result started to be increasingly drawn to the platform. However, the 
development and application of technology to tackle industry-wide problems is just one of 
HeadBox’s competitive strengths. The company soon realized that there are many unique 
spaces that are not being used during certain times of the day. By opening these spaces to 
its customers, HeadBox was not only able to respond to business customers’ growing 
demands for space variety (i.e., alternatives to traditional conference venues and meeting 
rooms) but, also to generate additional revenue for these space owners during their idle 
times. With new spaces being added daily, HeadBox currently offers over 10,000 of these 
in London, Manchester, Birmingham, and other large UK cities. Types of available spaces 
range from ‘traditional meeting rooms through galleries, workshops, warehouses, schools, 
universities, churches, photographic studios, cinemas, theatres, all the way to tree houses’ 
(founder and CEO). Since its inception, HeadBox has focused its platform offering on the 




neglected by the industry itself. The event industry ‘is way behind the customer and as 
such it presents a whole host of opportunities’ (founder and CEO). The list of the key 
value drivers, including the industry’s current modus operandi along with the re-invention 
approach pioneered by HeadBox, is summarised in Table 1.  
 
<Please insert Table 1 about here> 
  
Throughout the three main development phases, HeadBox has managed to move from an 
initial two-sided platform reliant on a single revenue stream to a multi-sided platform with 
multiple complementary, but independent, revenue streams in less than three years since its 
launch. This development was achieved by HeadBox’s focus on maximizing stakeholder 
value and integrating new stakeholders into the platform, while actively broadening its 
own value capture opportunities. We offer an in-depth description of HeadBox’s platform 
development in Table 2, which depicts this process across three distinct phases. 
Furthermore, we also refer to some of the developments that took place in different phases 
and use them as examples to illustrate how the identified value driving mechanisms 
impacted value creation and value capture in the case of HeadBox.  
 
<Please insert Table 2 about here> 
  
4.2 Case study analysis: Towards a Platform Stickiness - Stakeholder 
Profitability Framework 
  
The first-order categories and second-order themes (see Figure 1) were used as a basis for 
the development of our Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder Profitability Framework, 
illustrated in Figure 2. 







Figure 2. Platform Stickiness - Stakeholder Profitability  Framework  
 
 
This framework establishes the core criteria for platform viability: platform stickiness and 
stakeholder profitability (second-order themes). Through this framework, we demonstrate 
the complementary, yet, independent relationship between the two. The platform stickiness 
is grounded in the concept of value - a value that the central actorcan continuously create 
for its diverse stakeholders (i.e., by solving multiple stakeholder problems, the central actor 
increases their commitment and loyalty to the platform, making it ‘stickier’). In essence, 
the stickier the platform, the more stakeholders the central actor can draw in and keep. On 
the other hand, stakeholder profitability is concerned with the central actor’s ability to 
capture the value that it enables and creates for multiple stakeholders (both monetary and 
non-monetary value). The main argument we put forward is that the central actor’s efforts 
to increase stickiness and profitability need to be targeted at both of these dimensions to 
increase the viability of a platform. For example, by solely focusing on increasing the 
platform’s stickiness, the central actor might create more value than it can capture, 




the central actor captures more value than it has created, it increases its profitability, but at 
the same time it decreases the platform’s stickiness as existing stakeholders will start 
switching, and fewer new stakeholders will join the platform (perceived exploitation for 
existing stakeholders and low attractiveness of the platform for new stakeholders). Both of 
these scenarios are common in the sharing economy, but failing to achieve growth in both 
dimensions is detrimental to the platform’s viability in the long term. To achieve this, we 
have identified eight value-driving mechanisms (first-order categories) that shape and 
directly impact platform stickiness and stakeholder profitability. Because of their 
interrelated nature, we present these value-driving mechanisms in pairs, where each 
stickiness mechanism has one corresponding profitability mechanism. In doing so, we are 
establishing a missing link in the relationship between value capture and value creation by 
the central actor and other stakeholders within the sharing economy platform. Furthermore, 
the impact of each mechanism on its corresponding criterion (platform stickiness and 
stakeholder profitability) is indicated from ‘none’ to ‘high,’ forming the basis for the 
establishment of four stakeholder dimensions (unknown many, outer circle, inner circle, 
and addicted core). These dimensions correspond to the likelihood of stakeholders to not 
only be drawn into the platform but, also to remain with the central actor (increasing 
stickiness), which leads to increased stakeholder profitability for the central actor. The 
dimension ‘unknown many’ refers to the rather disengaged and indifferent stakeholders, 
who use the sharing economy platform mainly for transactional purposes – which often 
happens during the first phase of the platform development, as demonstrated in our case 
(see Table 2). Platform stickiness and stakeholder profitability are at their lowest. Both of 
these criteria grow as more stakeholders enter the ‘outer circle’ and ‘inner circle’ 
dimensions. In a sharing economy platform, both stakeholder profitability and platform 
stickiness reach their peak when entering the ‘addicted core’ dimension. In this dimension 
stakeholders’ involvement and commitment to the central actor and other stakeholders are 
at their highest point. A shift from the ‘unknown many’ to the ‘addicted core’ is by no 
means a natural development of the platform, but it is a well-designed process that is 
carefully crafted and managed by the central actor (Müller‐Seitz, 2012). In the case of 
HeadBox we mapped out this progression to start taking place in the second phase 
throughout the third one (see Table 2). As demonstrated in our case, HeadBox, like many 
other platforms before, has firstly focused on two distinct groups of stakeholders (venues 
and guests) for whom they provided basic value (low stickiness) and had only developed a 




managing the identified eight value mechanisms was able to systematically develop its 
offering. In doing so, HeadBox has managed to not only pull its stakeholders closer to the 
addicted core by extending the value, but it also started to widen its own abilities to profit 
from the platform by introducing additional revenue streams.  
‘I did not have these three revenue streams when I launched HeadBox......well I 
only had one when I started, so you have to take a step back, learn and focus on 
driving that stickiness from all sides of the marketplace [platform].’ (founder & 
CEO) 
Arguably, only very few platforms manage to develop the addicted core (see Täuscher & 
Kietzmann, 2017, who studied reasons for failures in sharing economy B2C platforms). 
However, doing so should be an ultimate goal of the central actor, as demonstrated in our 
case. In the following sections, we present eight dynamic mechanisms through which the 
central actor can draw its stakeholder closer to the addicted core and hence, increase the 
stickiness and profitability of its platform. 
 4.2.1 Stakeholder alignment (stakeholder profitability driver) and stakeholder altruism 
(stickiness driver) 
  
< Please insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figure 3.  Stakeholder alignment vs. stakeholder altruism 
 
The value creation among different stakeholder groups within sharing economy rests on 
the principles of shared values (Ouchi, 1979) and mutual collaboration that promote 
altruistic behavior (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006) among stakeholders within the sharing 
economy platforms. In other words, their commitment to the central actor and one another 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992) increases as a result, which leads to increased value and 
attractiveness of the platform (platform stickiness). However, for the central actor to 
establish and benefit from stakeholders’ altruistic behavior, it first needs to be able to align 
stakeholders’ interests. In doing so, it eliminates  partial conflict (Gottschlag & Zollo, 




Santos Leitão & Russi De Domenico, 2015; Turi, Domingo-Ferrer & Sanchez, 2018; 
Vargo & Lusch, 2004), which in turn requires central actor to invest less time and 
resources into attending to these differences and conflicts (stakeholder profitability). When 
stakeholders’ interests are aligned and altruistic behavior supported, the process of value 
creation is not dependent only on central actor’s abilities and resources, but instead it 
becomes a shared responsibility of the entire network.   
 
Therefore, as identified in our case, the first value-driving mechanism that influences 
stakeholder profitability and drives stakeholders closer to the addicted core is the central 
actor’s ability to align stakeholder interests. This ensures that, to some extent, all 
stakeholders are not only able to benefit from the central actor’s activities, but also from 
the activities of other stakeholders within the platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Visnjic 
et al., 2016). Achieving this level of alignment resides in the central actor’s ability to seek 
out and address stakeholders’ joint interests rather than focusing on prioritization of one 
group of stakeholders over another. However, stakeholder interests are often ‘in a partial 
conflict’ (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 28). To sustainably increase and maintain stakeholder 
profitability, the central actor needs to develop its offering in a way that adds value to 
multiple stakeholders within the platform. In the case of HeadBox, the clear demonstration 
of this was when in the third phase of its platform development, the company launched the 
‘widget.’  This widget enabled hosts to integrate HeadBox’s platform into their existing IT 
system, which allowed them to manage all their bookings from across all channels in one 
place. The widget also created more transparency and enabled guests to see real-time 
availability of the venues. Furthermore, given that the widget could function 
independently, venues that were not part of HeadBox’s platform were also able to use it. 
This not only increased the attractiveness of its platform among this group of stakeholders, 
but it slowly started converting these independent users into engaged customers. Therefore, 
by adapting its offering, HeadBox managed to address the demands of different 
stakeholders with the single offering (guests and hosts) and also to draw in new 
stakeholders (independent venues), which would not be possible without first aligning the 
interests of its stakeholders. 
‘The booking and payment widget came when quite a lot of venues started asking 




time guests were asking for real-time venue availability on the platform.’         
(head of marketing) 
Furthermore, by creating value for multiple stakeholders through advancing the platform’s 
offering, the central actor is able to capture more value by seeking revenue from all 
stakeholders for whom it created value. By charging an annual subscription fee for using 
the widget and monetising the data generated by this widget, HeadBox was able to develop 
additional revenue stream and thus increase the profitability of the platform. 
‘Whether as space chooses to join our platform, or just use the widget on a 
standalone website we will still have the information about the engagement of how 
people interact with the software. [In addition], the widget created additional 
revenues that we had not really thought about when we launched HeadBox.’ 
(founder & CEO) 
However, pursuing activities that would only create value for one stakeholder group while 
destroying value for others needs to be avoided. For example, for HeadBox it is possible to 
charge an additional fee for allowing paid listings on its venue search engine result page 
(similar to Google Adwords), but the HeadBox is strongly against this practice. While 
these paid listings would increase value capture opportunities from stakeholders who are 
willing to pay for inclusion and hence, create an additional revenue stream for HeadBox, 
pursuing this ‘in-search advertising model’ is not in the interest of all stakeholders. On the 
guest-side of the platform, stakeholders might start losing trust in HeadBox if it favors and 
promotes hosts that are on the top of the listing not because of their relevance or quality, 
but merely because they have paid to be there. Also, this can create conflict on the venue-
side where venues that work hard to keep improving the  quality of their offering to 
organically rise in ranking (HeadBox is using algorithm similar to Google that ranks 
venues based on combination of multiple relevancy factors and performance indicators) are 
likely to feel cheated and demotivated by those that simply pay to leapfrog others.   
‘We would never do paid listing … putting results at the top of the search results 
pages of the venues that have paid to be there just doesn’t really sit in line with us. 
What we want for everyone is to have a great experience and we want our guests to 
keep coming back and we want them to have access to really honest metrics on the 




By increasing stakeholder alignment, the central actor is also able to establish some form 
of reciprocal relationship among its diverse stakeholders. However, to increase platform 
stickiness through this reciprocity, it is imperative for the central actor to continuously 
reinforce stakeholder altruism, which leads to higher levels of cooperative behavior 
among stakeholders (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Van Lange & 
Semin-Goossens, 1998). A high level of stakeholder altruism is important both for drawing 
in new stakeholders and keeping existing ones (Kumar et al., 2017). To achieve this, the 
central actor needs to motivate stakeholders to actively participate in value co-creation 
activities (Visnjic et al., 2016). In our case, the central actor focused on rewarding altruistic 
behavior by developing algorithms that enabled establishment of a fully transparent merit-
based competition where those, who create more value for other stakeholders were 
rewarded by having, for example, a higher organic ranking, which in the case of hosts led 
to increased exposure and hence more value capture opportunities. 
‘Hosts have the ability to improve their [organic] ranking and get themselves on 
the top of the search result pages, and this is what we are encouraging. But to 
improve their position they will have to work for it – they will have to improve their 
response time, improve their profile or make sure that their reviews reflect the 
services they offer.’ (head of marketing) 
4.2.2 Platform control (stakeholder profitability driver) vs. stakeholder 
empowerment (stickiness driver) 
  




Figure 4. Platform control  vs. stakeholder empowerment  
 
Orchestrating a multi-stakeholder network requires a more fluid approach than for instance 
management of internal processes (firm level). To achieve this fluidity, the central actor 




platform (Wind et al., 2009). This will help the central actor to lower the barriers to entry 
for stakeholders and make them feel like equal partners in the platform (i.e., by integrating 
their existing internal processes). As further argued by Wind et al. (2009), empowering 
stakeholders to drive changes and managing activities that are primarily related to day-to-
day functioning of the platform (Wind et al. 2009) will allow  the central actor to direct its 
attention towards maintaining a strategic control of the platform (Gawer, 2014; Scholten & 
Scholten, 2012). As demonstrated in our case, for the central actor to draw stakeholders 
closer to the addicted core, it needs to focus on accommodating their rigid and often 
limited, existing internal processes without attempting to standardize and force 
stakeholders to comply. As argued by Edelman (2015, p. 97), “platforms must offer 
enough compatibility to showcase potential benefits, yet not so much that users delay 
switching to reap those benefits.” In other words, the central actor needs to empower 
stakeholders to allow them to drive changes, such as letting stakeholders introduce and 
enforce their own cancellation policies or pricing models that are compatible with their 
existing systems.  
 
‘We need to work around their existing processes. If that is not the case, it is a big 
objection for them [stakeholders] to use our platform. Step that we took in that 
direction was recognising that they have internal processes that need to be 
respected and we are going to have higher chances of success if we embrace those 
processes.  [Therefore], we started investing in features around invoicing, 
document workflows, we enabled corporate clients to pay by invoice as opposed to 
credit cards.’ (head of product) 
 
By standardizing some of these processes, the central actor can arguably gain better control 
over its stakeholders but, at the same time, it will create barriers to entry for many potential 
stakeholders. For example, HeadBox during the second phase of its platform development 
was quick to realise that its stakeholders’ pricing models differ significantly and hence it 
started moving away from a single standardized pricing (i.e., rental based on £ per hour) 
and instead introduced flexible pricing models where stakeholders had full control over 
how they will charge their customers. 
‘They can now buy the space by the hour, by the day, by minimum spend, by day 




applying different price models. We were the first; it has never been done in the 
industry before, but this is what the venues want.’ (founder and CEO) 
In addition to accommodating stakeholders’ current pricing models, HeadBox had applied 
a similar approach to its cancellation policy, which again was standardized at the early 
stage of HeadBox’s platform development (phase 1). 
‘At the start, all the cancellation policies were standardised. But in reality, the 
amount of exceptions that pushed us to deviate from those cancellation policies was 
quite overwhelming and we gave full control of cancellation policies to the hosts 
instead of holding onto it ourselves.’ (head of product) 
Empowering stakeholders may create an impression that the central actor will start losing 
control of the platform. However, as demonstrated by Headbox, the central actor can 
increase its platform control, while at the same time increasing stakeholder 
empowerment. To do so, it needs to establish a technological infrastructure through which 
all processes can be monitored and optimized. This infrastructure also provides 
stakeholders with tools and processes to function more independently. We have uncovered 
in our case that there are two facets to platform control. The first is operational control, 
where the central actor is concerned with the day-to-day management of the booking 
process. In the case of HeadBox, operational control has mostly been delegated to 
stakeholders by empowering them to take care of the process themselves through, e.g., 
managing their listings, setting prices and communicating directly with other stakeholders. 
The second type of control is related to the strategic management of the platform, and it is 
crucial for the central actor to fully control this itself. The primary focus here is on 
maintaining the long-term viability of the platform by balancing supply and demand, 
stakeholder onboarding, integration and development, and optimization of a platform-wide 
offering. Successful onboarding at all ends of the market (i.e., hosts, guests, corporates, 
service providers) is key to the success of a platform-based business (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003). Furthermore, the central actor needs to be able to avoid and manage the negative 
impact associated with the network effect (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014; Moser & Gassmann, 2016; Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016). 
This is in line with the findings of Kumar et al. (2017), who stress the need for the central 
actors to retain only those stakeholders that create sufficient value for the platform. For 
instance, each new venue is assessed by HeadBox to evaluate whether it meets the 




controlling the demand and supply, the central actor can onboard only those stakeholders 
that are beneficial for others (i.e., have a higher predisposition for reciprocal altruism). In 
doing so, the central actor can fully control the quality of the offering (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2010) without falling victim to network effects. This level of control is 
crucial for maintaining the long-term viability of the platform. 
‘We have a limited amount of suppliers in each category. If you have hundreds of 
suppliers, only a few get regular business, which will make our offering less 
appealing and for them less profitable.’ (founder and CEO) 
Quality needs to be controlled at all ends of the platform. As Kohler (2015, p. 74) suggests, 
the central actor needs to be able to “create different feedback loops that encourage 
stakeholders to participate in the curation process through reporting, voting, or reviewing 
the core value unit.”  It is not only the central actor that has obligations towards its various 
stakeholders but in sharing economy, also stakeholders have obligations towards the 
central actor and other stakeholders within the network (Fassin, 2012; Freeman et al., 
2010; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Lankoski, Smith, & Van Wassenhove, 2016). For example, 
in the case of HeadBox, guests have to leave detailed feedback; otherwise they are not able 
to use any other features or make future bookings through the platform. In essence, the 
curation is integrated into the core offering.  
‘It is mandatory; you have to leave a review. You can’t use anything on HeadBox 
until you have left the review. The layer [pop-up box] will follow you around and 
block everything until you have left a review.’ (head of sales) 
In our case, HeadBox started empowering its stakeholders since the first phase of its 
development, and it continued to do so. As a result, the company was not only able to 
make the platform easier to use for the existing stakeholders, but in doing so, it also 
managed to lower the barriers to entry and hence attract new stakeholders to the platform 
(increasing platform stickiness). By allowing stakeholders to take care of pricing, content, 
or cancelation policies, HeadBox could instead dedicate more time and resources on more 
strategic developments such as new services, quality control or stakeholder onboarding. 






4.2.3 Knowledge unification (stakeholder profitability driver) and access to unified 
knowledge (stickiness driver) 
  




Figure 5. Knowledge unification vs. access to unified knowledge 
 
A critical form of value capture from the platform is through collecting, analyzing and 
consequent unifying of the data by the central actor. This not only enables the central actor 
to capture value by discovering emerging stakeholder needs but, also to create value for its 
diverse stakeholders by providing access to collected information and thus opening an 
opportunity to improve the value they provide to other stakeholders within the network 
(Kohler, 2015). Opportunities for creating value are often uncertain, and the central actor 
needs to actively search for such opportunities (i.e., getting access to unique information or 
resources) (Rumelt, 1984). For the central actor to increase its ability to profit from its 
stakeholders, having a comprehensive understanding of their needs and interests is crucial. 
This can only be achieved through a continuous collection and analysis of stakeholder data 
from a range of sources (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Möller & Svahn, 2009; Müller‐Seitz, 
2012). However, to benefit from this data, the central actor needs to be able to unify it. The 
process of knowledge unification enables the central actor to attribute data from diverse 
sources to a particular stakeholder. In our case, HeadBox, during the second phase of its 
platform development has created a sophisticated framework that allows them to unify 
knowledge across all data sources. 
‘Our data tracking framework utilizes augmented metadata that we now capture 
and track and this is allowing us to unify data about customer acquisition across 
all channels, including offline. In a very granular level, we capture a lot of key 
events [actions] on the system in a structured way so that we can analyse and act 




The ability to unify knowledge often leads to early discovery of latent and emerging needs 
that can then be translated into additional revenue streams. 
‘When we looked at our database we realized that there were 10–15 people 
[individual accounts] from the same company using HeadBox that were often 
paying by using shared budgets. Based on this data, we launched the Corporate 
Dashboard, which broadened our reach and created an additional revenue 
stream.’ (founder and CEO) 
To increase the stickiness of the platform and the stakeholders’ ability to continuously 
improve the offering (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010), it is crucial that the central actor 
enables stakeholders to access unified knowledge. In the third phase of its platform 
development, HeadBox started to provide access to relevant real-time data to all of its 
stakeholders. In doing so, HeadBox started to drive the continuous improvement within the 
entire platform and put itself into the position of a data hub.  
‘HeadBox gets a lot of activity on its platform and so it can analyze all this data  
and derive the trends and see what the behavior tends to be and then use this 
information to augment offering.’ (head of product) 
For example, over the course of its platform development, this unified data led to the 
introduction of flexible pricing, launch of widget, customized cancellation policies and 
integration of 3rd party services (i.e catering, music or venue decoration services), which 
not only increased stickiness of the platform but, also its overall profitability. Furthermore, 
for stakeholders to also benefit from this knowledge, it needs to be not only unified and 
accessible but, also relevant to their evolving needs (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). It is the 
role of the central actor to ensure that all stakeholders have access to the knowledge in a 
form that they can act upon. 
‘We utilize data that we are tracking on the platform, but we also package this data 
and use it to benefit hosts, corporates and guests. For example, hosts can use data 
to benchmark themselves on different factors [rating, response time, price, etc.] 
and see how they perform on these when compared with others and then use these 
insights to improve.’ (head of marketing) 
This commitment to continuous improvement on the hosts’ side has positively impacted 
guests’ uptake and regularity at which they used HeadBox’s platform. By giving 




active part in the innovation and wider development of the offering, which in turn, 
increases both stakeholder profitability and platform stickiness. HeadBox was not only 
able to monetize its data and thus increase its value capture opportunities, but by allowing 
full transparency for guests, and innovation opportunities for hosts, it draws both of these 
stakeholder groups closer to the addicted core (i.e., they have become more involved and 
committed) and hence increasing the platform stickiness.  
4.2.4 Breadth of value capture (stakeholder profitability driver) and breadth of 
stakeholder value (stickiness driver) 
  





Figure 6. Breath of value capture vs. breath of stakeholder value 
 
Zhu and Furr (2016) postulate that while products produce only a single revenue stream, 
platforms can generate many. This is somewhat oversimplified because for the central 
actor to get closer to multiplying its revenue streams, it needs to be able to develop and 
support multiple types of value that its diverse stakeholder demand (Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013; Reypens et al., 2016). Therefore, continuously increasing stakeholder 
value is one of the main prerequisites not only for drawing stakeholders closer to the 
addicted core but, also for attracting new ones to the platform. Doing so is crucial for 
increasing the platform’s viability and should, therefore, be embedded in its wider value 
proposition. 
‘Our value proposition drives everything. It drives our growth and it is key to our 
strategy. Our purpose is the most important. We change and extend what we do and 
how we to do it, but never the why.’ (founder and CEO) 
The central actor, instead of growing the platform by focusing on increasing the number of 




throughout the second and third phase of its platform development, HeadBox focused on 
identifying and addressing wider needs of the narrower market, rather than widening up its 
existing market (e.g., growing the number of venues). For example, during the second 
phase, HeadBox rather than solely focusing on growing its stakeholder base focused on 
increasing the commitment and involvement of existing stakeholders through provision of 
additional value (i.e., account management, bespoke services, additional payment options, 
private consultations), which led to significantly higher retention rate. Many of the 
HeadBox’s existing corporate clients started using HeadBox exclusively for all of their 
event needs. 
‘After we have started to broaden our offering many of our corporate customers 
[stakeholders using corporate dashboard] have decided to introduced HeadBox 
across the whole network. We have become the one and only supplier through 
which they book all venues and related services.’ (head of product) 
For the long-term viability of the platform, it is crucial to always aim to address broader 
stakeholder needs instead of primarily trying to exploit the existing ones. As argued by 
Wind et al. (2009, p. 313) central actor sometimes needs to “sacrifice its own short-term 
interests to optimize the network—which benefits itself and its partners in the long run.” 
‘They [stakeholders] have different, varied needs and we wanted to accommodate 
all those needs in one place, so we have to keep the breadth. When we talk about 
our offering, we always go beyond the very narrow need for a space, and we try to 
accommodate all other possible needs that they can have.’ (head of product) 
By continuously extending the breadth of stakeholder value during the first two phases of 
the platform development HeadBox started to see a significant increase in inbound 
inquiries. Initially, HeadBox had to approach and persuade some of the well known and 
prestigious venues to get them onto the platform but, during the third phase, these venues 
started to come to HeadBox.  
‘Some venues were quite anxious about listing themselves on HeadBox when we 
have just started out. They were quite precious about their brand and what has 
been really great, we have seen many of those venues actually re-approach us and 
say; now we know you are doing really well, we want to be involved.’  




The high failure rate among platform-based businesses is usually caused by an unclearly 
defined value proposition (Clemons, 2009; Täuscher & Kietzmann, 2017) but, also by the 
central actor’s heavy reliance on a revenue model that is often based on a single revenue 
stream (i.e., commission). Equally, as the central actor continuously increases the breadth 
of stakeholder value, it needs to be able to benefit from the creation of this additional value 
(Bock & George, 2018) and hence also broaden its own value capture opportunities. As 
demonstrated in our case, HeadBox, instead of exploiting its commission-based revenue 
model, started focusing on the development of additional revenue streams. They did this by 
increasing the breadth of value created for stakeholders. This not only led to increased 
platform stickiness but, also improved the overall profitability of the platform. For 
example, in addition to commissions from bookings that HeadBox was relying on during 
the first phase of its platform development, it managed to introduce annual subscription 
fees (Corporate Dashboard and payment/booking engine – widget) and paid-for services 
for hosts (3D tours of venues) during the subsequent phases.  
‘I like this idea of having three “revenue legs” to a stool. I always like to think of it 
in this analogy because it means the chair with two legs would make you fall over. 
At the beginning our revenue model was transaction-based only. Only later we 
introduced an additional subscription-based revenue model. But I didn’t have these 
when I launched HeadBox; I only had one when I started.’ (founder and CEO) 
It is important to note that all of these additional revenue models while being 
complementary, are not interdependent, which makes the platform even more viable in the 
long term. Headbox has created multiple revenue streams that are interconnected, but at the 
same time they are entirely independent (i.e., losing one revenue stream would have no 
adverse impact on others). 
“They [revenue streams] are all linked... the more venues we get, the more 
bookings we get, the more opportunities there are to sell marketing packages and 
drive revenue from those venues. Our revenue streams are all interconnected, but 
they are driven by different things. Say if one month we made x amount from 
commissions, that would not have a direct effect on the other revenue streams. If 
one month we do not do enough venue sales, it does not mean we do not get enough 
marketing sales or subscriptions.’ (head of marketing) 
Once the central actor is able to establish multiple revenue streams, the sharing economy 




central actor’s ability to continuously increase the breadth of value capture opportunities 
by addressing broader stakeholder needs that determines the profitability of its platform.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The role of the central actor in developing a viable multi-stakeholder sharing economy 
platform resides in its ability to continuously explore, evaluate and act upon emerging 
opportunities to create and appropriate value. We introduced eight value-driving 
mechanisms through which the central actor creates value for its diverse multi-stakeholder 
platform and at the same time increases its own value capture opportunities. 
This study responds to several calls for empirical examination to uncover not only how the 
central actor can attract and keep stakeholders, but also how it can succeed over time 
(Reypens et al., 2016; Harrison & Wicks, 2013). Drawing on stakeholder theory and a 
longitudinal case of a B2B sharing economy platform, we have advanced the literature on 
the sharing economy and established the missing connection between value creation and 
appropriation by the central actor in multi-stakeholder platforms. Therefore, our 
contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the scarce literature on network 
orchestration, which claims that the central actor can deliberately influence and manage the 
development of a value network (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Müller‐Seitz, 2012). Findings 
from our case study point to eight value-driving mechanisms through which the central 
actor can develop an ‘addicted core’ and drive stakeholders closer towards it. Within the 
‘addicted core,’ the involvement and commitment of stakeholders to the central actor and 
other stakeholders reaches its highest point. We refer to this process as a creation of 
platform stickiness. The mechanisms facilitating platform stickiness and value creation for 
stakeholders include stakeholder altruism; stakeholder empowerment; access to unified 
knowledge; and breadth of stakeholder value. Furthermore, we have empirically derived 
that each value-creating mechanism has a complementary, yet independent, value-
appropriating mechanism (i.e., stakeholder alignment, platform control, knowledge 
unification, and breadth of value capture). Through these value-driving mechanisms, the 
central actor can monetize value created for its stakeholders and hence increase the 
profitability of the platform. Hence, our study contributes to a neglected stream of research 
that focuses on mechanisms through which the central actor can create and simultaneously 
appropriate value in multi-stakeholder networks (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & 




highlighted the importance of linking the value creation efforts with the monetization 
opportunities by the central actor (Parker et al., 2016). We emphasize the complementarity 
between identified mechanisms enabling the value creation (platform stickiness) and value 
appropriation (stakeholder profitability) in the Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder 
Profitability Framework. Our framework illustrates value-driving mechanisms in pairs 
(i.e., each stickiness mechanism has a corresponding stakeholder profitability mechanism), 
further stressing their interrelated nature and the importance of each dimension for 
developing a viable platform. We believe that the central actor needs to be able to maintain 
synergies between these dimension in the long term to ensure that it; firstly, can capture a 
proportion of a  value it creates, and secondly that it creates enough value for its 
stakeholders when compared to the value it captures for itself. Furthermore, we contribute 
to the existing research on stakeholder theory that has predominantly focused on 
responsibilities and obligations (mainly monetary) that the central actor has towards its 
various stakeholders (Fassin, 2012; Freeman et al., 2010; Lankoski et al., 2016). In 
contrast, our study provides insights into duties and obligations that stakeholders have 
towards the central actor and one another. In the sharing economy, stakeholders are not 
merely passive recipients of value, but they are also its co-creators. We posit that it is the 
role of the central actor to turn passive stakeholders (unknown many) into active and 
committed ones (addicted core). In doing so, the central actor can increase not only the 
stakeholder value but, also its own profitability. Our study presents eight mechanisms 
through which the central actor can initiate and manage this transition. Hence, we also 
respond to calls for adopting a more dynamic perspective in exploring the central actor’s 
management of its stakeholders (Lamberg et al., 2003, 2008; Fassin, 2008, 2010). As 
stated by Rong, Wu, Shi, and Guo, (2015, p. 294), the power of platforms lies in their 
underlying mechanisms that make it ‘possible to transform a passive social network into an 
active value creation chain.’ Finally, our study extends the prior literature on the sharing 
economy that has been predominantly built on a limited number of well-known case 
studies (AirBnB and Uber) in the B2C and C2C markets (Richter, Kraus, & Syrjä, 2015; 
Mair & Reischauer, 2017). We contribute to this line of research by providing empirical 
insights from a unique case study of a company that introduced the first B2B sharing 
economy platform into the UK’s event industry. Thus, we provide further evidence that the 





5.1 Managerial implications and future research 
  
Along with contributing to stakeholder theory and extending the emerging debate on the 
sharing economy, our study also posits several implications for managers. As postulated by 
Freeman (1984), a firm’s success depends on the attention that managers pay to its 
stakeholders’ needs and interests. Based on our data analysis, we have developed a 
framework that can guide managers in identifying, addressing and profiting from these 
needs and interests. In essence, our framework acts as a tool that managers can use to 
increase the effectiveness of their stakeholder management strategies, especially in diverse 
multi-stakeholder networks. The framework offers several applications that practitioners 
can explore. First, managers can use our framework as a roadmap for the development of 
sharing economy platforms. Plenter et al. (2017) posit that platform-based businesses in the 
sharing economy have a high failure rate and this is often due to the discord between the 
value they create and the value they can capture (Clemons, 2009; Parker et al., 2016). 
Therefore, by adopting our framework, managers can increase the viability of their 
platform offering by simultaneously increasing its stickiness and profitability. This means 
that managers can not only achieve but, also leverage the synergies between value creation 
and value capture activities. Second, advisors and investors can use this framework as a 
diagnostic tool for identifying gaps in value capture and creation opportunities in sharing 
economy platform-based businesses they are advising or are considering investing in. Both 
managers and potential investors by using this framework can quickly evaluate and 
benchmark the current performance of a platform against all eight dynamic mechanisms. 
For instance, this will enable managers to; establish focus and priorities, aiding the 
development of strategies and actions needed for addressing the current situation, or setting 
targets and benchmarks. Furthermore, in the case of investors, use of our framework can 
lead to more accurate evaluation of otherwise difficult-to-evaluate types of business that 
SE platforms often are. Lastly, applicability and the use of our proposed framework can be 
extended beyond SE platform-based businesses context. We posit that managers from all 
businesses that serve diverse stakeholder groups can use this framework to increase 
stickiness and profitability of their offering through effective and more strategic 
stakeholder management. Opportunities for creating value are often uncertain, and 
managers need to actively engage in a search for such opportunities (Rumelt, 1984). 
Therefore, we believe that our framework will be a valuable addition to many managers’ 




we acknowledge that the present paper has several limitations that provide areas for future 
research. Our findings are limited to a single case, and therefore we recommend future 
research to adopt methods that could enhance the generalisability of our findings. Future 
empirical studies could also try to validate our Platform Stickiness – Stakeholder 
Profitability Framework and extend it to include moderating factors for the identified 
value-driving mechanisms. In our case, the development of the addicted core took around 
two years, and we believe that this timeframe is contingent upon different factors that can 
also be explored in future studies. While we have identified and argued the existence of a 
strong link between the dynamic mechanisms that drive platform stickiness and 
profitability, future studies can examine the importance of achieving and maintaining a 
balance between the two. Lastly, this study examines platforms operating in the sharing 
economy, but we believe that our findings can be extended beyond this context and we 
would like to see future studies take up this challenge. 
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None to very low transparency – the 
role of venue providers is to build 
barriers among stakeholders to 
maintain control, usually 
withholding contact information, 
data, price, and thus disabling direct 
communication and value co-
creation among stakeholders. 
Full transparency – enabling 
stakeholders to directly 
communicate with one another, 
sharing data and knowledge about 
other stakeholders and maintaining 
flexible, but fully transparent, 
pricing. 
  
Price elasticity & 
flexible pricing 
options 
Inability to facilitate and support 
different pricing preference and 
requirements of diverse venue 
providers – imposing a standardised 
pricing model on all stakeholders. 
To improve efficiency within the 
wider industry, Headbox initially 
introduced flexible pricing (over 250 
possible pricing combinations) and 




Variety / venue 
choices 
Lack of new venue openings – 
focused on traditional, easily 
accessible venues such as hotel 
meeting rooms and conference 
centres. Imposing standard venues 
on customers/stakeholders who have 
a multitude of different needs. 
Widening venue choices to creative 
and non-traditional places by 
identifying ‘idle’ assets/unused 
spaces and thus accommodating 
diverse needs of venue seekers 
(venues range from opera houses 
through to warehouses, ateliers and 




Very low adoption and integration of 
new technologies – industry adheres 
to standard ‘directory listing’ 
approach. Within industry there is 
no support for real-time information 
(RTI) and collection and use of 
‘rich’ data. 
Addressing industry inefficiencies 
through technology – development 
of digital marketplace with ‘rich’ 
data being central to the success of 




To facilitate transaction between 
stakeholders without enabling their 
direct contact – maintaining distance 
between different customers 
(stakeholders). 
Acting as a ‘central actor’ – 
facilitating and aiding two-way 
communication between different 
customers. Headbox is minimising 




Usually focused on addressing one 
or very limited needs of many 
diverse stakeholders – ‘few of 
many’. 
Focused on addressing wide range 
of needs for a specific/limited 







Imposing general standards that all 
stakeholders need to adhere to (i.e., 
pricing, cancellation policy) – 
standardising everything to maintain 
control over all stakeholders. 
Supporting and encouraging 
stakeholder diversity by 
accommodating their existing 
processes and limitations – not 
standardising what does not need to 





Data capture is often transaction 
focused with limited focus on rich 
data. Lacking mechanisms to collect 
granular and actionable feedback 
from stakeholders. Data is used only 
by intermediary, often for 
monitoring purposes. 
Capturing and unifying rich data 
with focus on stakeholder 
engagement and experience. Using 
technology to collect granular and 
actionable feedback (specific to 
particular aspect of offering). Data 
is shared across platform to 
continuously improve different 
aspects of wider offering (each 
stakeholder can do something better 




Using rigid processes that often 
discourage stakeholders to purchase 
(i.e., imposed invoicing mechanism). 
Strong focus on removing actual and 




Isolating rather than integrating 
stakeholders, leading to very limited 
value co-creation opportunities 
within the platform. Intermediaries 
are aiming to ‘exploit’ each side of 
the market – ‘divide and conquer’. 
Integrating stakeholders to facilitate 
and promote value co-creation 
within the platform. 
Customer 
retention 
Business strategy focused on 
customer acquisition rather than 
retention. Intermediaries struggle to 
retain customers by their lack of 
focus on their wider needs. 
Accommodating wider needs of 
customers and continuously 
innovating the offering to appeal to 
all stakeholders involved. Business 
strategy is focused on retention by 






reducing visibility and stakeholder 
control to get them ‘locked in’. 
Relationship-driven. Increasing 
visibility, engagement and 
empowering stakeholders to 
























Phase 1: Developing basic offering Phase 2: Extending offering and platform Phase 3: Platform management and leverage 
Headbox focused on attracting two different groups of 
stakeholders – venue owners (hosts) and venue 
seekers (guests) – to its platform. However, Headbox 
was only generating revenue from the host side of the 
market, where it was charging commission on 
bookings. Along the basic revenue model, the company 
has identified a non-monetary but strategically 
important way to capture value through collection and 
unification of different customer-rich data (combination 
of transactional, behavioral, engagement and 
experience data). In doing so, over time Headbox was 
able to build a more accurate picture of their 
stakeholders. By collecting rich data from multiple 
touchpoints, Headbox soon realized that a large 
number of their business customers come from 
different functions of the same. This was an initial 
impulse to launch the Corporate Dashboard (Phase 2). 
Its role was to reduce this fragmentation (i.e., several 
individual accounts from the same company) and to 
create value for these corporations by improving their 
budget control and internal transparency. The 
Corporate Dashboard aggregates these individual 
accounts under one ‘roof’ and offers corporations 
valuable insights through the provision of data. So far, 
Headbox’s Corporate Dashboard is used by more than 
100 blue chip corporates, including HSBC, Uber, and 
Expedia. By launching the Corporate Dashboard, 
Headbox entered its second phase of development. 
Headbox started increasing not the only value that it 
created for its stakeholders but also the number of 
stakeholders that it integrated into the platform (i.e., 
third-party services, corporates). This led to an increase 
in revenue streams that Headbox was able to generate 
from different stakeholder groups. Besides the 
commission fee from venues, Headbox was also 
generating revenue from annual subscription fees for 
Corporate Dashboards, paid-for services for hosts (i.e., 
professional photography, 3D tours and premium 
listing) and listing fees for third-party suppliers. During 
the second phase, Headbox, rather than solely focusing 
on growing its stakeholder base, focused instead on 
increasing the commitment and involvement of existing 
stakeholders, which led to a significantly higher 
retention rate. For example, many of the corporate 
clients started using Headbox exclusively for all their 
event needs. The rising commitment to the platform 
also became evident among the hosts, who started 
investing more into improving their listings by adding 
professional photography and 3D tours, and by 
improving their performance (acting upon feedback 
provided by guests and Headbox). In other words, 
Headbox started to become the only platform these 
hosts used for getting bookings. Lastly, this 
commitment to continuous improvement and innovation 
had positively impacted on the uptake and regularity 
with which businesses used the platform. 
During the last phase, Headbox kept focusing on further 
widening the value it creates for its diverse stakeholders 
while exploring new revenue opportunities. Size and 
complexity of the network grew significantly and 
Headbox decided to focus on maintaining its full control 
without restricting its stakeholders (i.e., through 
unnecessary standardization). From a technical 
perspective, Headbox aimed to maintain its speed and 
flexibility of innovation, but also to increase technological 
manageability of the platform, and initiated a move from 
monolithic to modular product architecture. In other 
words, Headbox started to ‘break down the single 
monolithic product into isolated components. As the 
platform evolves it tends to get bigger, until it hit the 
point when any changes or incremental improvements 
are slowing down because the risks grow with the size of 
the product, which requires a lot of investment and effort 
into testing and managing that impact’ (head of product). 
In addition to moving away from monolithic architecture, 
during this phase Headbox also managed to extend its 
offering beyond its immediate platform by introducing a 
payment engine that can be used as a standalone 
product. In doing so, Headbox helped its existing hosts 
to integrate all their bookings from across different 
channels. By having this level of real-time visibility into 
all venues’ bookings, Headbox started developing 
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- Ability to 
collect 
transactional 
data (not   
directly) 
- Ability to 
easily search, 
book and pay 
for unique and 
creative venues 
that meet wider 
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tools to help 
stakeholders 
to improve 
sales (i.e., 3D, 
virtual tours) 
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unified data 
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rich data (not 
monetized 
directly) 
  
 
 
